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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1995, the tobacco industry was an impenetrable fortress.  The industry 
admitted nothing, denied everything, and successfully defended nearly every lawsuit 
filed against it.2  Then, in 1995, a war was waged against the tobacco industry by 
both the federal and state governments.  The war began on the federal level with 
President Clinton’s approval of federal legislation that declared nicotine an addictive 
drug and authorized the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to seek 
jurisdiction over tobacco products as “drug delivery devices.”3  Additionally, the 
President announced broad executive action which sharply restricted the advertising, 
promotion, distribution and marketing of tobacco products with the goal of 
protecting children and adolescents from the dangers of tobacco products.4 
Following President Clinton’s lead, U.S. Attorneys General from 46 states5 
joined forces to file a single lawsuit that has made the participating tobacco 
companies6 willing to settle to terms that will change the tobacco industry forever.7  
This settlement is known as the Master Settlement Agreement.  For example, banned 
are advertisements on billboards, in sports arenas and stadiums, shopping malls, 
buses and trains.  Sales of T-shirts, caps and other merchandise are banned, as well 
                                                                
2Betty D. Montgomery, Montgomery Announces Tobacco Settlement–Ohio Will Receive 
Hundreds of Millions Per Year (last modified Nov. 18, 1999) 
<http://www.ag.state.oh.US/pressrel/tobanni.htm> 
3President’s News Conference, 31 WKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1415 (August 10, 1995). 
4FDA Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,453 
5Betty D. Montgomery, Master Settlement Agreement (visited Jan. 8, 1999) 
<http://www.ag.state.oh.US/pressrel/tobanni.htm>  The Attorney Generals involved in the 
Master Settlement Agreement are from: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming.  Officials from the following were also involved: American Samoa, District of 
Columbia, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands of the United States. 
6Montgomery, supra note 5, at 2.  The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement participating 
companies are Philip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown and Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., and Lorillard Tobacco Company. 
7Clint O’Connor, So Long, Marlboro Man:  Tobacco Settlement Means End of Cigarette 
Billboards, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, March 7, 1999, at K-1.  The Master Settlement 
Agreement reached in November of 1998 calls for $206 billion to be paid to the participating 
states over the next 25 years.  Id. 
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as promotion of tobacco products in movies, TV shows, theater productions, music 
performances, videos and video games.8 
Because a number of the terms contained in the Master Settlement Agreement 
have sharply restricted the tobacco industry’s ability to market and advertise its 
products, the settlement agreement has First Amendment commercial speech 
implications.  Should challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement arise, the 
Supreme Court would employ the pathbreaking decision for determining when the 
government may restrict commercial speech, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission of New York9 and its progeny to assess its 
constitutionality.10 
This Note discusses and assesses the Government’s likelihood of passing 
constitutional scrutiny with the Master Settlement Agreement’s restrictions in light 
of the First Amendment case law.  A majority of the restrictions will likely pass 
constitutional scrutiny because they meet the demanding requirements of Central 
Hudson and its progeny.  The author believes that a few of the restrictions need to be 
more narrowly tailored in order to pass constitutional scrutiny.  Suggestions on how 
to narrowly tailor the restrictions to comport with Central Hudson are proffered by 
the author. 
Section II provides an overview of the history of First Amendment commercial 
speech jurisprudence.  It discusses cases that foreshadowed the Central Hudson 
decision, the Central Hudson decision itself, the progeny of Central Hudson which 
has slightly refined the original four prong test for commercial speech, and addresses 
the possible trends in light of the progeny.  Section III of the note addresses why the 
Master Settlement Agreement may have problems passing constitutional scrutiny and 
what parties may have standing to challenge the provisions.  Section IV gives an in-
depth look into how the restrictions will fare when analyzed under the Central 
Hudson four prong test, and individually assesses selected restrictions.  Finally, 
Section V makes suggestions on how the government can cure the restrictions that 
may be found constitutionally infirm. 
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Traditional View on Commercial Speech 
In the early days of the commercial speech doctrine, the Supreme Court afforded 
no protection to  “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker 
and its audience.”11  The Court stressed the “traditional view” that communications 
to which First Amendment protection would be given were not of a purely 
commercial nature.12  The Supreme Court, however, rejected the traditional view that 
commercial speech was not subject to First Amendment protection when it decided 
                                                                
8Id. 
9Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980). 
10Montgomery, supra note 5, at 2. 
11Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
12New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964). 
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Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc.13  
The Court held that speech that proposes no more than a commercial transaction can 
be protected under First Amendment law.14  The Court refused to accept the State’s 
paternalistic approach, forbidding it from completely suppressing the dissemination 
of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity because it was 
fearful of the information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.15  The 
Court acknowledged that society has a strong interest in “the free flow of 
commercial information”, including the “proper allocation of resources in a free 
enterprise system”.16  Therefore, the First Amendment can protect commercial 
speech from unwarranted governmental intrusion.17 
B.  Central Hudson’s Four-Prong Standard for Analyzing Commercial Speech 
After deciding Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme Court determined Central 
Hudson,18 thereby laying down a four-part test for determining whether a given 
regulation of commercial speech violates the First Amendment.  The government is 
permitted to regulate commercial speech if the following four conditions are met: (1) 
the speech qualifies for protection in that it is neither misleading nor concerns an 
unlawful activity; (2) the asserted governmental interest in support of the restriction 
is substantial; (3) the restriction directly advances the interest; and (4) the regulation 
is not “more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.” 19   The third and 
fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test require consideration of the fit between the 
government’s substantial interest and the means chosen to accomplish that 
objective.20  These elements of the test have proven to be the most difficult to satisfy. 
Applying the test to the facts of Central Hudson, the Court held that the utilities’ 
promotional advertising was speech protected by the First Amendment.  The State 
had two interests that the Court found to be substantial, conservation of energy and 
maintenance of a fair and efficient rate structure.  Although, the Court found that 
there was a direct link between the ban and the substantial interest of energy 
conservation, the ban on energy conservation was more extensive than needed to 
further the state’s interest and, therefore, the State failed to satisfy the fourth prong 
of Central Hudson.21 
                                                                
13Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976). 
14Id. at 762. 
15Id. at 773. 
16Id. at 765. 
17Id. at 761-62. 
18Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (1980). 
19Id. at 566.  For purposes of First Amendment analysis, examples of government interests 
that might qualify as “substantial” include preserving the reputation of professions, Florida 
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); protecting the health, safety and welfare of 
citizens, Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476 (1995); and protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of children, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
20United States v. Edge Broadcasting, Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
21Id. at 431. 
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C.  Modifications to the Central Hudson Four-Prong Standard 
In Edenfield v. Fans,22 the Supreme Court struck down a state ban against 
solicitation by certified public accountants (CPA’s) for failure to satisfy the third 
prong of Central Hudson.  The State of  Florida imposed a blanket ban on direct, in-
person, uninvited solicitation by CPA’s who sought to communicate truthful non-
deceptive information proposing a lawful commercial transaction.23  The Court stated 
that the government identified certain interests in regulating solicitation in the 
accounting profession that are important and within its legitimate power, but that the 
government failed to provide substantial evidence to show that the regulation directly 
and materially advanced the state’s purported interest.24  Most importantly in 
Edenfield, the Court watered down the “not more extensive than is necessary” fourth 
prong of Central Hudson.  Thus, the current requirement to satisfy the fourth prong 
“means–end fit” is that the means be “tailored in a reasonable manner” to serve the 
government objective.25  In other words, some looseness in the means-end fit will be 
tolerated where what is regulated is commercial speech.26 
Another important case in First Amendment commercial speech jurisprudence 
was Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico.27  In 
Posadas, the Court held that the government could ban advertising for casino 
gambling aimed at Puerto Rican residents because the commercial speech at issue 
concerned a lawful activity and was not misleading or fraudulent.28  Posadas was 
significant because the Court’s opinion stood for the idea that if an activity could be 
completely banned, advertising of the activity could be completely banned, or tightly 
regulated.29  This holding gave state legislatures greater power to regulate the 
advertising of products that are lawful, but believed by the legislature to be harmful.  
Examples of such “vice” products are cigarettes, liquor, and gambling.   
                                                                
22Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
23Id. at 763-64. 
24Id. at 771. 
25Id. at 767. 
26Id. at 769.  The fact that there may be some other means that would serve the 
government interest as well, while restricting the commercial speech less, will not be fatal.  
Some degree of looseness in the means-end fit will be tolerated when what is being regulated 
is commercial speech.  Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
27Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986). 
28Id. at 340-41. 
29Id. at 345-46.  The majority stated in Posadas that “the greater power to completely ban 
casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling.”  
Id.  This is also known in First Amendment jurisprudence as the “greater includes the lesser” 
theory.  The theory posits that if a state can completely ban a particular product, it could 
instead choose to ban or tightly regulate advertising for that product because this would be a 
lesser intrusion.  Id. 
302 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 14:297 
This theory, however, was rejected in 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island30 by a 
number of Justices of the Supreme Court because “it is quite clear that banning 
speech may sometimes prove far more intrusive than banning conduct. . . .”31 “[A] 
state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, 
nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes.”32  In 44 Liquormart, the 
Court indicated a willingness to apply a more stringent standard of review to 
government restrictions of commercial speech.  The Court unanimously struck down 
a Rhode Island statute that provided for a blanket ban on all retail price advertising 
for alcoholic beverages on the ground that the state failed to establish a “reasonable 
fit” between the restriction and the stated goal of reducing alcohol consumption.33  
Specifically, the Court reasoned (1) that the state offered insufficient proof that the 
restriction would advance its interest, and (2) that alternative forms of regulation 
were available to the state to achieve its goals that would not involve a restriction of 
speech.34  However, the Court refused to engage in “speculation or conjecture,” 
finding it an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial 
speech directly advances the State’s asserted interest.35  Following 44 Liquormart, it 
became clear that the majority of the Court intends to review stringently government 
regulation of accurate commercial speech regarding a lawful activity. 
D.  Recent Trends in First Amendment Law in Light of 44 Liquormart 
Two recent commercial speech cases decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provide some insight into how restrictions on 
commercial advertising might be handled in light of 44 Liquormart.  Both Penn 
Advertising v. Baltimore36 and Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke37 addressed Baltimore 
city ordinances covering commercial speech.  Penn Advertising involved an 
ordinance prohibiting cigarette advertising on billboards located in designated areas 
of the city38 and Anheuser-Busch39 involved a similar ordinance prohibiting outdoor 
                                                                
30517 U.S. 484 (1996).   
Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was “up to the legislature” to choose 
suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.  The Posada’s majority’s conclusion 
on that point cannot be reconciled with the unbroken line of prior cases striking down 
similarly broad regulations on truthful, nonmisleading advertising when non-speech-
related alternatives were available.  Id. at 509-10. 
31Id. at 511.  Only three other Justices joined directly with Stevens in rejecting Posadas, 
but at least four, if not all five, of the remaining members seemed to agree that the reasoning 
in Posadas should no longer be followed.  Id. 
32Id. at 510. 
33Id. at 505-06. 
34Id. 
3544 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507. 
36Penn Adver. v. Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 
(1996), on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). 
37Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1821 
(1996), on remand, 101 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). 
38Id. at 1321. 
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advertising of alcoholic beverages.  Both ordinances included an exception for 
permitting outdoor advertising in certain commercially and industrially zoned areas 
of the city.40  Applying the Central Hudson test in Anheuser, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the restriction on the advertising of 
alcoholic beverages and determined that the ordinance directly and materially 
advanced the city’s interest in promoting the welfare and temperance of minors41 and 
that the relationship between the restriction and the purported government objective 
“falls well within the range tolerated by the First Amendment”42 for the regulation of 
commercial speech.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
reasoned that because adults could still receive advertising messages and information 
through other media, and commercial and industrial zones were exempted from the 
billboard ban, the ordinance was not more extensive than necessary to serve the 
governmental interest.43  Similarly, in Penn Advertising, the Court of Appeals held 
that the asserted public interest in preventing the purchase and consumption of 
cigarettes by minors was directly advanced by the billboard restrictions and that the 
advertising regulation was narrowly tailored to comply with the  First Amendment.44 
Penn Advertising and Anheuser-Busch, decided prior to 44 Liquormart, were 
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of that 
decision.  On remand, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision, 
holding that the ordinances were constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions, 
not a blanket ban like that in 44 Liquormart.45  The Supreme Court denied certiorari 
in both cases.46 
Another recent case, Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,47 addressed the 
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), a federal law aimed 
at protecting minors from indecent materials transmitted over the Internet.  The 
Supreme Court found the CDA to be unconstitutional because “in order to deny 
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large 
amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to 
one another.”48  The Court held that the CDA’s burden on adult speech was 
unacceptable because it was possible that “less restrictive alternatives would be at 
least effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to 
                                                          
39Id. at 1309. 
40Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1321; Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1309. 
41Id. 
42Id. at 1317. 
43Id. 
44Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1325-26.  
4544 Liquormart, 101 F.3d at 330. 
46See Penn Adver., 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997); See Anheuser-Busch, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). 
47Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
48Id. at 2346. 
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serve.”49  The government failed to explain why less restrictive alternatives would 
not be as effective as the CDA, therefore the law was struck down.50 
III. EVALUATING THE MASTER SETTLEMENT UNDER CENTRAL HUDSON 
A.  Constitutional or Unconstitutional?    
In order to accurately assess the constitutionality of the Master Settlement 
Agreement’s marketing and advertising restrictions, one must keep in mind the 
Government’s substantial, if not compelling, interest in preventing and reducing 
youth smoking.  Most restrictions on marketing and advertising contained in the 
Master Settlement Agreement will be upheld as being constitutional because the 
Government will be able to demonstrate that it has complied with Central Hudson’s 
four-prong test, thus permitting the Government to constitutionally restrict the 
tobacco companies commercial speech.51  The constitutionality of the restrictions is 
further supported by the fact that even though smoking is a lawful activity for adults 
to engage in, the purchase and consumption of tobacco products by minors is 
unlawful.52  Even if the tobacco companies are able to demonstrate that the 
advertising and marketing of their products is lawful and nonmisleading in order to 
qualify for some level of First Amendment protection, narrowly tailored restrictions 
on such advertising and marketing designed to protect minors may be both justified 
and constitutional.53 
B.  Who is Empowered to Challenge? 
Before assessing the constitutionality of the restrictions on marketing and 
advertising contained in the Master Settlement Agreement, a reviewing court must 
first determine if the party or parties bringing suit have proper standing to appear 
before the court.54  Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement, the participating 
tobacco companies have agreed to waive their right to constitutionally challenge the 
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement.55  Courts have upheld the voluntary 
waiver of constitutional rights, including the right to free speech protected by the 
First Amendment, that was obtained through a settlement agreement.56  However, 
                                                                
49Id. 
50Id. at 2348. 
51See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
54ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 (2d ed. 1994).  “Standing is the 
determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a particular matter to a 
federal court for adjudication.”  Id.  The Supreme Court has declared that “[i]n essence the 
question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the 
dispute or of particular issues.”  Id.  (Chemerinsky quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
55See Montgomery, supra note 5 at XV.  Voluntary Act Of The Parties. 
56Wilkicki v. Brady, 882 F. Supp. 1227, 1232-38 (D.R.I. 1995). 
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this will not be enough to insulate the Master Settlement Agreement from 
constitutional challenges by other parties that have an interest in the lawsuit. 
Even though participating tobacco companies may not constitutionally challenge 
the Master Settlement Agreement, there are several other possible parties that may 
attain standing to challenge the restrictions as unconstitutional infringements on their 
First Amendment rights.  The Master Settlement Agreement does not specifically 
state that the settlement provisions apply to the non-participating tobacco companies, 
making it highly likely that these companies will seek standing to obtain a favorable 
ruling on the settlement’s restrictions.57  Also, new tobacco companies that were not 
party to the contractual agreement may also seek standing to challenge the 
restrictions.58  Additionally, consumers may challenge the settlement provisions as 
an infringement of their right to receive information on tobacco products.59  
Furthermore, billboard advertising and media companies may also gain standing to 
challenge the restrictions.60  It is likely that some party will have standing to 
challenge the restrictions on marketing and advertising contained in the Master 
Settlement Agreement.61 
C.  Assessing the Government’s Ability to Constitutionally Restrict Commercial 
Speech under Central Hudson 
1.  Does the Speech Qualify for Constitutional Protection? 
The constitutional inquiry of Central Hudson begins with determining whether 
the commercial speech qualifies for constitutional protection.  Commercial speech 
which is misleading or deceptive, or which proposes an illegal transaction is not 
entitled to First Amendment protection.62  Although the use of tobacco products by 
adults is not illegal, the advertising and marketing directed at use and consumption 
by minors does relate to unlawful conduct.63  The sale of tobacco products to minors 
is unlawful in all 50 states, and a majority of those states prohibit the purchase, 
possession or use of tobacco by minors.64  This is the argument that the FDA has 
forwarded  to implement restrictions on the tobacco companies rights to advertise.  A 
number of the FDA’s restrictions have been incorporated into the Master Settlement 
Agreement.65  “Thus, to the extent that tobacco advertising is aimed at children and 
                                                                
57See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
58Id. 
59Virginia State Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 
757. 
60Penn Adver., 63 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 1995).  
61See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
62Virginia Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 762. 
63See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
64Id. 
65FDA Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,471. 
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adolescents, or at least at contemplating under age use, the FDA argues that its 
restrictions on advertising and promotion of tobacco products are constitutional.”66 
Despite the efforts of the FDA to have tobacco advertisements categorized as 
“relating to an unlawful activity” and “inherently misleading” thereby falling out 
from under the umbrella of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court is likely 
to determine that tobacco advertisements are entitled to constitutional protection 
because they reach adults in addition to minors.  “Established First Amendment 
doctrine makes clear, however, government may not reduce adults to the status of 
children, by regulating expression directed primarily at adults on the grounds that 
minors may be exposed to it.”67  “The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply 
cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.”68 
It has also been argued that tobacco advertisements are inherently misleading 
because no advertisement gives adequate warning of the wide range of serious and 
life threatening diseases that may be caused by ordinary use of the tobacco 
products.69  This argument is likely to fail because “unlike advertising for virtually 
any other lawful product, tobacco advertising is already required by government to 
place a variety of explicit warnings concerning the dangers of smoking.”70  Adults 
are completely capable of reading the warnings on labels and counter-balancing the 
pleasures of engaging in the activity with the dangers.71  The Court is likely to 
dismiss the “inherently misleading” argument because it has already ruled in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy72 that the government may not restrict speech for 
paternalistic reasons. 
Since tobacco companies have a lawful interest in advertising their products to 
adults, and provided that the advertisements are found truthful and nonmisleading, 
the Court is likely to find the advertisements entitled to First Amendment 
protection.73  The Government’s restrictions must also survive the next three prongs 
of Central Hudson to pass constitutional scrutiny. 
2.  Is The Government’s Interest Substantial? 
Assuming that Prong 1 of Central Hudson is satisfied and that the commercial 
speech qualifies for at least some protection, the government must now forward a 
substantial interest to justify the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement 
Agreement.  One of the main objectives of the settlement is to reduce children’s use 
of tobacco products74 which has been labeled a “health epidemic problem.”75  The 
                                                                
66Id. 
67Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 
608 (1996). 
68Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 
(1983)). 
69Redish, supra note 67. 
70Id. at 609.  The warnings appear at 15 U.S.C. § 1333.  
71Id.  
72Virginia State Board of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 773. 
73Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
74Montgomery, supra note 2. 
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Supreme Court is likely to find the government’s interest in protecting the nation’s 
youth from the harms of tobacco use a substantial, if not compelling interest, because 
the Court has repeatedly recognized that the protection of children deserves special 
solicitude when considering a restriction that implicates the First Amendment.76  The 
government should not have difficulty meeting the second prong of Central Hudson.  
3.  Do The Restrictions Advance The Government’s Interest “To A Material 
Degree”? 
When Central Hudson was originally decided, the third prong required that the 
regulation of commercial speech be “no more extensive than necessary” to achieve 
the government’s objective.77  But Central Hudson’s progeny has relaxed the means-
end fit, requiring that the means be “designed in a reasonable way” to serve the 
government objective (i.e. that the means advance the objective in a “direct and 
material way.”)78  The fact that there may be some other means that may serve the 
government interest as well, while restricting the speech less, will not necessarily be 
fatal.  Some degree of looseness in the means-end fit will be tolerated when 
commercial speech is being regulated.79 
Satisfaction of this prong may pose some difficulty for the government to satisfy 
because “the quantity and quality of evidence that the courts should require in order 
to uphold a restriction on commercial speech is unsettled and reflects disagreement 
among Supreme Court justices.”80  In Florida Bar v.Went For It, Inc.,81 a survey 
prepared by the state bar association was sufficient to support a ban on targeted 
direct-mail solicitation by attorneys, despite certain methodological shortcomings.  
The dissent insisted that the bar association should have conducted the survey in 
accordance with basic standards of social science research.  In Burson v. Freeman,82 
the Court declared that some decisions are justified based on “simple common 
sense.”  However, most recently in 44 Liquormart,83 Justice Stevens asserted that 
“anecdotal evidence and educated guesses” are insufficient to satisfy the 
government’s burden to show that the ban on price advertising would “materially” 
reduce alcohol consumption. 
In light of the more stringent evidence that 44 Liquormart’s holding seems to 
require, it is important that the Attorneys General maintain that their goal is to reduce 
children’s use of tobacco products.  They must run the same offensive as the FDA, 
that cigarette advertising is directed at youth, who could not be legal buyer’s of the 
                                                          
75Office on Health and Smoking, U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Preventing 
Tobacco Use Among Young People: A Report of the Surgeon General (1994) at foreword.  
76New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of children represents a compelling state interest). 
77Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 572. 
78Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993). 
79Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
80Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
81515 U.S. at 618. 
82Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
83517 U.S. at 505. 
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product and should therefore be restricted.  The other alternative, the “discourage 
consumption” objective which portrays that tobacco is bad and that less advertising 
will mean less consumption, was disfavored in 44 Liquormart.84  In that case, the 
government presented no findings of fact, or any evidentiary support whatsoever to 
suggest that its speech prohibition [would] significantly reduce market-wide 
consumption.85  The Court refused to engage in such “speculation or conjecture” 
which is an unacceptable means of demonstrating that a restriction on commercial 
speech directly advances the government’s asserted interest.86  The safer argument 
for the Attorneys General to make is that the restrictions will directly and materially 
reduce the use of tobacco products by children because there are findings to support 
such a substantial interest. 
The third prong of Central Hudson requires the government to demonstrate that 
the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement “directly and 
materially advance”87 the substantial governmental interest in reducing children’s use 
of tobacco products.  “To meet this burden, the government must show that tobacco 
advertising ‘plays a concrete role in the decision of minors to smoke’ and that the 
restrictions will ultimately contribute to protecting the health of children.”88  The 
government can demonstrate that the means-end fit is tailored in a reasonable 
manner by providing evidence and findings of fact that demonstrate that there is an 
association between tobacco advertising and underage smoking.89  There is a 
substantial amount of evidence, both direct and indirect, that supports this link.  
Many different well-respected institutions, including the American Medical 
Association,90 have conducted thorough studies, in accordance with basic standards 
of social science research, that affirmatively link tobacco advertising with youth 
smoking.  These studies have found that nearly 3,000 Americans start smoking every 
day, and most of these new smokers are children or adolescents.91  Studies also show 
that over ninety percent of those who become long-term smokers begin smoking as 
children or adolescents.92  A person who does not start smoking as a minor is 
unlikely to become a smoker later on in life.93  It is no secret that children are aware 
                                                                
84Id. at 506. 
85Id. (citing Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770). 
86Id. at 507. 
87Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771.  
88Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1 (quoting FDA Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44, 474). 
89Id. 
90Joseph R. DiFranza et al., RJR Nabisco’s Cartoon Camel Promotes Camel Cigarettes to 
Children, 266 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 3149-50 (1991).  A recent study published by the American 
Medical Association demonstrated that more pre-school age children can match Joe Camel to 
cigarettes than Mickey Mouse to Walt Disney.  
91Ronald M. Davis, Reducing Youth Access To Tobacco, 266 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 3186 
(1991). 
92Health-Care Provider Advice on Tobacco Use To Persons Aged 10-22 Years, 44 
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 826 (1995). 
93Peter Rheinstein & Thomas McGinnis, Children and Tobacco: The Clinton 
Administration Proposal, 52 AM FAMILY PHYSICIAN 1205 (1995). 
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of, respond favorably to, and are influenced by cigarette advertising.94  The evidence 
demonstrates that a strong correlation exists between tobacco advertising and 
consumption by minors.95 
In addition, the government must continue to develop the record that concretely 
establishes  findings of fact and evidence that links tobacco advertising directly with 
underage tobacco product usage.  The government will then be prepared to 
demonstrate to a court that the regulation’s  means-end fit is “tailored in a reasonable 
manner” to accomplish the government’s substantial interest.96  Development of the 
record is essential in demonstrating compliance with 44 Liquormart’s recent scrutiny 
of the nexus between speech restrictions and the advancement of the government 
interest.97 
4.  Is There A Reasonable Fit Between The State’s Regulation And The Stated 
Interest?  
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires the court to examine 
whether a “reasonable fit” exists between the limitations placed on commercial 
speech and the government’s substantial interest.98  The restrictions on speech must 
not be “more extensive than necessary”.99  This test requires a “fit that is not 
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best 
disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”100  The 
government need not employ the “the least restrictive means to accomplish its goal, 
the fit between the means and ends must be ‘narrowly tailored’.”101 
When the Court applied this standard in 44 Liquormart, it concluded that the 
government could have used other, less restrictive, non-speech means to “promote 
temperance” than banning price advertisements.  For example, the government could 
have accomplished its objective by establishing a minimum price, raising the sales 
tax, instituting educational campaigns, or placing per capita limits on purchases.102 
The Court struck down the outright ban on advertising because it interfered with 
the core informational function of commercial speech, the advertising of “who is 
                                                                
94Federal Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 44, 475. 
95Id. at 44,474, 44,488. 
96Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). 
97Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1. 
98Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 769.  
9944 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 528-29. (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) When Central 
Hudson was first decided, the fourth prong required that the regulation be “not more extensive 
than necessary” to serve the government interest.  However, several post-Central Hudson 
cases show that the Court has watered down the “not more extensive than necessary” to “least 
restrictive means to accomplish its goal”.  Today, all that is required of the means-end fit is 
that the regulation be “narrowly tailored” to serve the governmental interest.   
100Id. (citing Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480). 
101Id. 
102See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1 (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 528). 
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producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what price.”103  The 
majority of the restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement are 
distinguishable from the outright ban the Court struck down in 44 Liquormart.  The 
Master Settlement Agreement adopts narrowly tailored restrictions that will serve the 
government’s asserted interest.  The narrowly tailored restrictions have virtually no 
effect on the tobacco companies’ ability to advertise the core informational 
commercial speech. 
In applying the fourth prong of Central Hudson to determine if the restrictions 
are narrowly tailored enough in relation to the reduction of tobacco consumption by 
minors, it is important for the government to demonstrate to the courts that less 
restrictive alternatives than banning speech have already been employed and found 
lacking.  State governments have enacted laws that banned the sale of cigarettes to 
minors, and employed “stings” and identification checks in order to reduce underage 
smoking.104  These non-speech, least restrictive alternatives have not shown much 
progress in reducing underage smoking; therefore, restrictions on speech are justified 
as a last resort.105 The Master Settlement Agreement incorporates numerous non-
speech-restrictive options106 in addition to commercial speech provisions in hopes 
that a comprehensive scheme will achieve the government’s stated purpose of 
reducing underage tobacco use.  This multifaceted approach to reducing youth 
tobacco use will be helpful when a court analyzes the fit between the particular 
speech restrictions and the goals of the legislation.”107 
D.  The Master Settlement Agreement’s Marketing and Advertising Restrictions 
The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement contains a number of marketing and 
advertising restrictions.  For purposes of this Note, the author has chosen to discuss 
the following eight marketing and advertising restrictions contained in the 1998 
Master Settlement Agreement that directly implicate First Amendment commercial 
speech rights.108 
•  A requirement that tobacco product advertising be limited to black text on 
white   background except for advertising in adult-only facilities and in “adult 
publications”109;110 
                                                                
10344 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 496. 
104See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at 15. 
105Id. 
106Id. at 16.  Some of the non-speech-restrictive provisions include licensure of retail 
tobacco product sellers, restrictions on access to tobacco products, and the “look back” 
provisions.  “Look back” provisions set specific targets for the reduction in current levels of 
underage smoking and use of smokeless products over the next ten years.  Id.  
107Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *16. 
108See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief.  The listed restrictions in this 
article are in no way exhaustive of all the restrictions contained in the 1998 Master Settlement 
Agreement.  See id. at III. Permanent relief, (a)-(r). 
109FDA Format and Content Requirements for Labeling and Advertising of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco, 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)(2) (1996).  As defined in the FDA’s 1996 rule’s, 
“adult-only publications” are defined as those:  (1) whose readers that are 18 or older 
constitute 85 percent or more of the publication’s total readership, or (2) that are read by two 
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•  A ban on sponsorships, including sponsorship of concerts and sporting events, 
in the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand;111 
•  A ban on all non-tobacco merchandise, including caps, jackets and bags, 
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand;112 
 •  A ban on all outdoor advertising of tobacco products as well as a ban on 
advertising indoors when the advertising is directed outside;113 
•  A ban on the use of human images and cartoon characters in tobacco 
advertising (e.g. Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man)114;115 
•  A ban on all tobacco product advertising on the Internet that is accessible from 
the U.S.;116 
•  A ban on direct and indirect payments for tobacco images in movies, television 
programs and video games;117 
•  A prohibition on youth targeting in the advertising, promotion or marketing of 
tobacco products.118 
E.  Application of Central Hudson to Individual Restrictions of the Master Settlement 
Agreement to Determine The Likelihood of Passing Constitutional Scrutiny 
It has been demonstrated that under the first prong of Central Hudson, the 
tobacco advertisements will likely be granted First Amendment protection provided 
that the advertisements are found to be truthful and nonmisleading, because the 
tobacco companies have a lawful interest in advertising their products to adults.  It 
has also been demonstrated that the Court will likely find that the government has a 
substantial interest in reducing children’s use of tobacco products.  Therefore, this 
article now focuses on evaluating each individual restriction’s ability to pass the 
third and fourth prongs of Central Hudson.  If a restriction is able to pass these 
prongs, it is likely to pass constitutional scrutiny by the courts and be upheld.  If a 
                                                          
million or fewer people under age 18.   Based on current readership estimates, publications 
such as Rolling Stone and Sports Illustrated would be limited to text-only advertisements, 
whereas Time and Newsweek would not be subject to the restriction.  FDA Regulations, 61 
Fed. Reg. at 44, 514 (1996).   
110See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief (c). 
111Id. at (c). 
112Id. at (f). 
113Id. at (d). 
114See O’Connor, supra note 7, at K-1.   
[D]avid McLean, an actor that played the Marlboro Man in TV commercials, died of 
lung cancer in 1995.  His widow sued Philip Morris and eight other tobacco 
companies for wrongful death.  The suit claimed that McLean was sometimes required 
to smoke five packs of Marlboro’s per photo session to ‘get the ashes to fall a certain 
way, the smoke to rise a certain way and the hand to hold the cigarette in a certain 
way.’ The case is still pending.” 
115See Montgomery, supra note 5 at III. Permanent Relief (b). 
116Id. at (e). 
117Id. at (e). 
118Id. at (a). 
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restriction fails these prongs, the government may need to reconsider the restriction 
in light of Central Hudson and its progeny and tailor the regulation appropriately. 
1.  Requirement that Tobacco Product Advertising Be Limited to Black Text on a 
White Background Except for Advertising in Adult-Only Facilities and Adult 
Publications  
The restriction requiring that tobacco product advertising be limited to black text 
on a white background except in adult-only facilities and publications is likely to be 
upheld as constitutional because it is narrowly tailored to limit children from 
exposure to tobacco advertisements.  These restrictions are designed specifically to 
limit children’s exposure to  commercial messages relating to a product that is 
unlawful for them to purchase.  Additionally, these restrictions in no way interfere 
with the tobacco companies ability to advertise core information about their products 
to adults as described in 44 Liquormart.119  This restriction carves out least restrictive 
exceptions that only allow an adult’s right to receive product information to be 
abridged if a certain percentage of the readership is adolescent.  This restriction will 
likely be upheld under Central Hudson because it directly advances the 
government’s interest in the least restrictive manner and therefore satisfies prongs 
three and four.  
2.  Restriction on Sponsorships, Including Sponsorships of Concerts and Sporting 
Events in the Name, Logo, or Selling Message of a Tobacco Brand 
The government may have some difficulty meeting the requirements of Central 
Hudson with this restriction because it is less focused on the asserted interest.  This 
restriction is sweeping because its application completely extinguishes speech to 
both adolescent and adult audiences.120  However, the government may be able to 
craft an argument that centers around the “ubiquitous nature” of tobacco 
sponsorship.121  It may be difficult, if not impossible, to construct less restrictive 
alternatives that continue to adequately protect children from harmful messages.122  
“[T]he limitations appear to satisfy the Reno standard, which permits the limitation 
of adult speech if less restrictive alternatives would not be at least as effective in 
achieving the government’s ends.”123  All that is required of the fit between the 
means and end is that the means be “reasonably tailored” to serve the governmental 
interest, some looseness being tolerated in the means-end fit where what is regulated 
is commercial speech.124  The courts may grant the government some leeway because 
the restrictions advance the government’s interest in a “direct and effective.”125  It 
appears that this restriction will also be able to pass constitutional scrutiny under 
Central Hudson. 
                                                                
119517 U.S. at 496. 
120See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *11. 
121Id. at *17. 
122Id. at *11. 
123Id. at *17. 
124See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770. 
125Id. at 773. 
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3.  Restriction Banning All Non-Tobacco Merchandise, Including Caps, Jackets and 
Bags, Bearing the Name, Logo or Selling Message of a Tobacco Brand 
This restriction is another one of the more sweeping provisions contained in the 
Master Settlement Agreement because it will completely ban all merchandise 
bearing the name, logo or selling message of a tobacco brand.  Again, the 
“ubiquitous” nature of tobacco advertising makes the crafting of less restrictive 
alternatives that will not sacrifice the government’s goal of reducing youth smoking 
almost impossible.126  If this merchandise is permitted to be marketed, it will 
undoubtedly end up in the hands of a child and undermine the government’s 
substantial interest.  The government will be able to use the nature of tobacco 
advertising against the tobacco companies and substantiate with evidence that a 
complete ban is the least restrictive alternative possible to obtain the government’s 
objective.  The Court is likely to determine that adult speech may be limited because 
the Reno standard has been satisfied; in other words, less restrictive alternatives 
would not be at least as effective in achieving the government’s ends.127 
4.  Restriction on All Outdoor Advertising of Tobacco Products As Well As A Ban 
On Advertising Indoors When the Advertising is Directed Outside 
This restriction on all outdoor advertising is another of the more sweeping 
provisions of the Master Settlement Agreement.  This means the end of all cigarette 
billboards.128  The ordinances considered by the Court in Penn Advertising and 
Anheuser-Busch permitted outdoor advertising in certain commercial and industrial 
zones.  In contrast, the restriction contained in the Master Settlement Agreement 
makes no exceptions of this nature but instead eliminates all outdoor advertising of 
tobacco products.  Further, in 44 Liquormart, the Court stated that “if alternative 
channels permit communication of the restricted speech, the regulation is more likely 
to be considered reasonable.”129  The Master Settlement Agreement, on a whole, 
“forecloses multiple avenues of speech, the [Master] Settlement [Agreement’s] ban 
on all outdoor advertising will likely be scrutinized more carefully than similar 
restrictions standing alone.”130  Some sources seem to believe that “if an adequate 
factual record is developed, it may be possible to demonstrate that there are no less 
restrictive alternatives that achieve a reduction in youth smoking.”131  However, it is 
more likely, discerning from the trends in the aforementioned cases, that this 
restriction must be more narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. 
                                                                
126See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17. 
127Id. 
128See O’Connor, supra note 7.  Pursuant to the Master Settlement Agreement, all 
billboards must be removed by April 22, 1999.  Among the brand name cigarette billboard’s 
that will become extinct are Marlboro, Winston, Salem, Kool, Newport, Virginia Slims and 
other brands. 
129517 U.S. at 529-30.  (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) See also Anheuser-Busch, 101 
F.3d at 329 (Court noted approvingly that Baltimore’s restriction did not foreclose plethora of 
newspaper, magazine, radio, television, direct mail, Internet, and other media available to 
Anheuser-Busch and its competitors). 
130See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17. 
131Id. at *17.  See Reno, 521 U.S. at 875. 
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5.  Restriction Banning the Use of Human Images and Cartoon Characters in 
Tobacco Advertising (e.g. The Marlboro Man and Joe Camel) 
This is one of the Master Settlement Agreement’s more sweeping restrictions 
because it will completely extinguish speech when applied.132  The Marlboro Man 
and Joe Camel will no longer be permitted to appear on billboards and in 
advertisements.  The government claims that the use of cartoon characters and 
human images are inherently more appealing to children than they are to adults.  It is 
true that the Court has held that First Amendment interests may be reduced when 
minors are involved.133  But, the Court has also held that speech aimed at adults may 
not be restricted for fear that minors will be affected as well.134  While the 
government’s interest in deterring smoking by minors is clearly a ‘substantial’one, it 
is not nearly as clear that the prohibition of cartoon characters meets the final two 
elements of the Central Hudson test.  “In order to satisfy the elements, the 
government will have to establish both that the prohibition ‘directly advances’ the 
interest in deterring smoking by minors and that there exists a reasonable fit between 
the means chosen and the desired ends.”135 
The government needed to concretely demonstrate that a significant contributing 
reason for teen smoking is the tobacco companies’ use of cartoon characters and 
human images.  This is where the findings of fact and evidence that the government 
and FDA have collected will come into play to provide the necessary link between 
cartoon characters and teen smoking, possibly allowing the government to establish 
that the restriction is the least restrictive alternative.  Again, the nature of tobacco 
advertisement will make constructing less restrictive alternatives that protect children 
from harmful messages difficult, if not impossible.  The Court is likely to determine 
that the Reno standard is satisfied, thus allowing the limitation of adult speech if less 
restrictive alternatives would not be at least as effective in achieving the 
government’s ends.136  Provided that the government keeps developing the record of 
evidence to support the least restrictive alternative argument, it is likely that the 
courts will find that this restriction accords with all prongs of Central Hudson. 
6.  Restriction On All Tobacco Advertising On The Internet That Is Accessible From 
The U.S. 
The Master Settlement Agreement’s restriction on advertising on the Internet 
raises many constitutional questions.  Internet advertising is not posted in public 
places and visible to all, including children, but rather requires the user to seek out 
Internet access.  Also, access to Internet advertising can be regulated by the age of 
                                                                
132Id. 
133New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
134Michigan v. Butler, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding unconstitutional a statute 
making it an offense to make available to the general public materials found to have a 
potentially harmful influence on minors because the statute is “not reasonably restricted to the 
evil with which it is said to deal.”) 
135See Redish, supra note 67, at 630. 
136See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17.  
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the user.137  This restriction is equivalent to a blanket ban on commercial speech that 
was struck down in 44 Liquormart.  The Court has reviewed such blanket bans with 
“special care mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive 
constitutional review.”138  The blanket restriction on Internet advertising will affect 
access to the Internet by both children and adults,  therefore “censoring speech 
addressed to adults in situations where it may be possible more narrowly to tailor the 
restrictions to meet the objective of protecting children.”139 
In Reno,140 the Court struck down the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) as 
unconstitutional because in order to deny minors access to indecent material over the 
Internet, it “suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional 
right to receive and address to one another.”141  The Court held that the “the burden 
on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as 
effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.”142 
Similarly, the Court will likely find this blanket restriction on Internet access 
unconstitutional because less restrictive alternatives are available that will be as 
effective in achieving the government’s ends.  The government needs to more 
narrowly tailor this restriction so that it materially advances the government’s 
interest in reducing children’s use of tobacco products. 
7.  Restriction on Direct and Indirect Payments for Tobacco Images in Movies, 
Television Programs and Video Games 
Insofar as the restriction concerns advertising on television programs and video 
games, the Court is likely to consider the restriction to be narrowly tailored because 
of the “invasive nature of the broadcast medium and the ease with which children 
can view television advertising.”143  The restriction seems to be the least restrictive 
alternative available to the government to serve the interest in reducing children’s 
use of tobacco products. 
With respect to the restriction on advertising in movies, the restriction appears to 
be  tailored too broadly to achieve the government’s substantial interest.  Movies 
with ratings of “R” and “NC-17" are restricted to adult audiences only, therefore this 
type of commercial speech regulation will not be sustained because it provides “only 
ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”144  The government will 
have to narrowly tailor this restriction carefully in order to pass the third and fourth 
prongs of Central Hudson. 
                                                                
137Id. 
13844 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504. 
139See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17.  
140521 U.S. at 875. 
141Id.  
142Id. 
143See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17. 
14444 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 505. 
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8.  Restriction on Youth Targeting in the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of 
Tobacco Products  
The Attorneys General have accused the tobacco industry of unconscionably 
targeting youth with their use of cartoon characters and human images in the 
advertising and marketing of their products.  This restriction goes to the 
government’s stated substantial interest in reducing the number of youth that smoke.  
The government will need to demonstrate with a vast amount of evidence that the 
tobacco companies have in fact, over the years, intentionally targeted youth with 
their tobacco campaigns.  Provided that an accurate factual record is developed, the 
government will likely be able to convince the Court that the restriction on youth 
targeting directly advances the government’s interest in reducing youth smoking. 
IV.  CURING THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS 
Under recent Supreme Court precedent, some of the restrictions contained in the 
Master Settlement Agreement may well be found to be overbroad and 
unconstitutional.145  It is therefore recommended by the author that these “restrictions 
be more narrowly tailored to create a closer nexus between the limitations and the 
government’s interest in reducing youth smoking.”146  The government must 
demonstrate to the Court that it has made an attempt at crafting the least restrictive 
alternative possible and that the restriction on speech is necessary to directly and 
materially advance the government’s interest in reducing youth smoking. 
The government must begin by more narrowly tailoring the restriction that deals 
with outdoor advertising of tobacco products.  As the Court has indicated in the past, 
blanket bans on commercial speech are not looked upon very fondly.147  The 
government must keep in mind the facts and holdings of Penn Central Advertising 
and Anheuser-Busch.  The ordinances upheld in these cases were found to be 
narrowly tailored because they included exceptions for outdoor advertising in certain 
commercially and industrially zoned areas of the city.148  The government must allow 
for such exceptions in this Master Settlement Agreement provision.  Perhaps, no 
outside advertising should be permitted within a designated distance of school zones, 
playgrounds and residential areas.  However, allowances must be made for 
advertising in commercial and industrial zones that are removed by a designated 
distance from the above mentioned areas.  This would be a less restrictive alternative 
to a complete ban on commercial speech that would still allow the government’s 
interest to be achieved. 
The government must also find a way to cure the restriction that deals with 
tobacco product advertising on the Internet that is accessible in the U.S.  The Internet 
and the law that pertains to it is currently under development.  The courts are just 
now beginning to become involved in the regulation of  the Internet.  The blanket 
ban on advertising on the Internet is too broad because it restricts speech that adults 
are constitutionally entitled to receive and address to each other.149  There are a 
                                                                
145See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *11.  
146Id. 
14744 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504. 
148Penn Adver., 63 F.3d at 1321.  Anheuser-Busch, 63 F.3d at 1309. 
149Reno, 521 U.S. at 845. 
1999-2000]THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 317 
number of less restrictive alternatives that may be constructed to more narrowly 
tailor this restriction while at the same time be at least as effective in achieving the 
government’s objective.  The Court in Reno found that currently available user-based 
software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent 
their children from accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will 
be widely available.150  Other possible alternatives discussed in Reno, were requiring 
that indecent materials be “tagged” to facilitate parental control, making exceptions 
for materials with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental 
choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet differently than others.151  The 
Internet restriction should also be careful to include a provision that subjects the 
Internet to the no  use of cartoon characters and human images restriction so the 
government’s interest will not be completely undermined.152  As has been 
demonstrated, the government has a number of avenues it can take in order to more 
narrowly tailor the Internet restriction so that it complies with Central Hudson. 
The last restriction that needs to be cured is the ban on direct and indirect 
payments for tobacco images in movies, television programs and video games.  This 
provision can be more narrowly tailored without much difficulty.  Tobacco 
advertisements shall not be permitted at movies that are rated with a “G” or “PG-13", 
but shall be permitted at “R” and “NC-17" movies because these movies are to be 
viewed by adults or with parental discretion.  This least restrictive alternatives strikes 
the proper balance because it will allow the government to achieve its objective 
without trampling on the commercial speech rights of adults. 
This restriction should also include video tapes of movies (e.g. VCR tapes, movie 
rental tapes) in its provision because children may be able to gain access to video 
tapes that are rated “R” and “NC-17" that are laying around the house and be 
subjected to tobacco advertisements.  This would directly undermine the 
government’s substantial interest in reducing youth smoking. 
It is further recommended by the author that the government keep up its fact 
finding mission and continue to develop the record in order to be able to clearly 
establish the link between youth smoking and tobacco advertising.  It is clear that the 
Supreme Court’s trend is towards concrete evidence, rather than “speculation or 
conjecture” when it comes to assessment of commercial speech restrictions.153 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Note discusses the First Amendment implications of the marketing and 
advertising restrictions contained in the Master Settlement Agreement between the 
U.S. Attorneys General and the participating tobacco industry.  The commercial 
speech doctrine, including the path breaking decision of Central Hudson and its 
progeny, is discussed to provide the framework for analysis of the Master Settlement 
restrictions.  Issues of constitutionality and standing were also assessed.  After a 
                                                                
150521 U.S. at 844.  The user-based software that the Court speaks of in Reno may 
currently be available, since Reno was decided on June 26, 1997.  The author of this note does 
not profess to have an in depth knowledge of the Internet nor the software available in its use. 
151Id. 
152See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17. 
15344 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 507. 
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thorough evaluation of the Master Settlement provisions, this Note concludes that the 
compelling nature of the government’s interest in protecting children and adolescents 
from the dangers of smoking and the narrowly tailored approach that a majority of 
the advertising restrictions adopt, much of the Master Settlement Agreement will 
likely withstand judicial scrutiny under the applicable legal standard.154  Even the 
restrictions that are constitutionally infirm at present, can be more narrowly tailored 
and saved if the government follows the suggestions contained in this note.  Based 
on the high stakes that are involved in this Master Settlement Agreement for many 
parties that did not participate in the settlement negotiations and final agreement, it is 
likely that a party will seek standing to challenge the restrictions contained in the 
Master Settlement Agreement.  The government must continue to develop the record, 
adhere to its substantial interest in reducing youth smoking, and pay close attention 
to Central Hudson and its progeny in order to be prepared for the constitutional 
challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement. 
When the reader evaluates the Master Settlement provisions and its implications, 
it is important to keep in the back of one’s mind the politics that have historically 
surrounded the tobacco industry in order to more fully understand and assess the 
recent developments between the tobacco industry and state governments.  It is 
“important not to allow the government to stifle communications aimed 
predominantly at adults under the guise of protecting children.”155  “Nowhere is this 
danger more serious than in attempts to regulate tobacco advertising.  The asserted 
justifications for such regulation of the truthful promotion of a lawful product derive 
exclusively from a premise of governmental paternalism that is fundamentally 
inconsistent with both the purposes served by free speech and the democratic system 
of which free speech is a central element.”156  Some proponents of big tobacco 
believe: 
The First Amendment interests threatened by the regulation of tobacco 
advertising are considerably more substantial than many have recognized.  If the 
government is permitted to prohibit truthful advocacy of a lawful activity because of 
the fear that citizens will make unwise choices, there is no basis on which to 
distinguish government’s efforts to do the same in other areas of public 
decisionmaking.  Bluntly put, prohibition of tobacco advertising constitutes a 
governmental exercise in mind control of its citizens–hardly a course of action 
consistent with the letter, spirit or tradition of the First Amendment right of free 
expression.157 
It has already been pointed out that the government may have some “not so 
substantial” motives for settling.  But, what about big tobacco?  What are they really 
hiding that entices them into settling for such one-sided restrictions?  Clearly, the 
Master Settlement Agreement is not the straw that is going to break Joe Camel’s 
back (or pockets), only his image.  Or will the Master Settlement Agreement even do 
this? 
                                                                
154See Hogan & Hartson, supra note 1, at *17. 
155See Redish, supra note 67, at 638. 
156Id. at 592. 
157Id. at 639. 
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“Someone once said tobacco was American before America was American, 
which is true.  It is one of our most enduring crops.  Just like Marlboro is one of our 
most enduring ad campaigns.  It just can’t play outside anymore?”158  Big tobacco 
will find another way to continue on. 
LORI ANN LUKA159 
                                                                
158See O’Connor, supra note 7, at 8-K. 
159The author of this Note is currently employed as an Associate at the law firm of Kelley 
& Ferraro LLP and practicing in the area of Complex Litigation.  The author of this Note 
would like to thank her father George, mother Ivana, and brother Christopher Luka for their 
love and support throughout her law school career.  This Note is dedicated to my father who 
unfortunately was not able to live to see it go to print. 
